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I.  INTRODUCTION:  “PARTNER CAPTURE” AND THE CHANGING FACE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
In the last decade, public-private partnerships—jointly funded and 
executed collaborative projects between public international 
organizations and private corporations or foundations—have 
proliferated.  Cash-strapped international organizations find donors’ 
offers of aid irresistible, and donors have discovered that working with 
experienced and respected “public international organizations” (that is, 
international organizations answerable primarily or exclusively to public 
 
* Postgraduate Research Fellow, University of Texas School of Law. A.B., Princeton; D.Phil., 
Oxford; J.D., LL.M. (International Legal Studies), New York University.  I am grateful to Rachel 
Barkow, Rebecca Bers, Sara Bronin, Jessie Brown, Simon Chesterman, Kristina Daugirdas, Chad 
Flanders, John Golden, Benedict Kingsbury, Michael Livermore, Colin Marks, Paul Monteleoni, 
Doug Wilson, the late Thomas Franck, and the scholars and fellows of the Furman Academic 
Program at the N.Y.U. School of Law, for helpful comments.  Thanks as well to the excellent staff 
of the Akron Law Review. 
1
Bradley: Partner Capture in Public International Organizations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
12_BRADLEY_WESTERN GC.DOCX 2/14/2011  11:06 AM 
262 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:261 
entities, usually states1) offers significant logistical and symbolic 
benefits.  While this trend has been recognized, and some concomitant 
accountability and legitimacy concerns have been noted, legal 
scholarship on the rise of international public-private partnerships 
remains scant.  Worse, the organizations have failed to set up adequate 
safeguards against capture by partners whose interests may not align 
with those of international organizations and their members or 
constituents.  Taking lessons from U.S. administrative and regulatory 
law, this Article outlines the need for—and a workable proposal for—
such safeguards.  It focuses on the United Nations (U.N.), the most 
visible and universal of public international organizations.  But this 
Article’s framework applies to other organizations, such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, subject to this danger—a 
danger that this Article coins the term “partner capture” to describe. 
The Article unfolds in four parts. 
Part I discusses the changes that public-private partnerships have 
wrought on the landscape of international organization funding and 
describes, as an example, the expanding partnership activities of the 
United Nations.  The U.N. recently established an Office for 
Partnerships, which grew out of a decade of extensive contact with Ted 
Turner’s U.N. Foundation.2  The U.N.’s experience illustrates the 
importance partners can have, not simply on specific projects but also in 
bringing large-scale structural change to organizations. 
Part II unpacks the concept at the heart of this Article: partner 
capture.  Drawing on principles of bureaucratic behavior and political 
economy familiar from the U.S. administrative law context, Part II 
identifies problematic aspects of the U.N.’s current partnership 
activities.  It notes the inadequacy of current accountability structures to 
deal with partner capture problems, and it shows that the stakes are 
sufficiently high that the U.N. and other public international 
organizations should aggressively address partner capture. 
Part III proposes an institutional solution for the U.N.  It then 
argues that such a solution could be implemented in other organizations, 
to ensure that partnerships serve the interests not just of private partners 
but also of organizations and their members or constituents.  More 
 
 1. For this customary terminology and on public international organizations as distinct 
objects of study, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 1-57 
(2005). 
 2. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Office for Partnerships:  Rep. of the Secretary-
General, Summary, U.N. Doc. A/62/220 (Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Office for Partnerships 2007 
Report], available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/A_62_220_Aug2007.pdf. 
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specifically, an independent review bureau within the U.N. Office for 
Partnerships—roughly on the model of the U.S.’s Office of Management 
and Budget and various Inspectors General—should be created.  The 
proposed Office of Independent Review would provide both 
retrospective evaluation and prospective guidance, independently 
assessing partnership initiatives proposed or already undertaken by U.N. 
entities, with the goals of developing best practices, guarding against 
agenda distortions, and monitoring for abuse by partners and their 
agents. 
Part IV concludes by noting that new approaches such as those 
suggested by this Article form an important part of an ongoing, and 
healthy, expansion of the sources and structures of international law.  
Traditional international law doctrines and theories are inadequate to 
describe and organize the activities of quickly expanding networks of 
public and private entities operating across national borders.  Drawing 
on domestic analogues with a long history in theory and practice 
furnishes one promising avenue for the development of effective legal 
solutions to new and complex problems. 
II.  THE RISE OF PARTNERSHIPS:  PRIVATE MONEY AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Public and private entities have long acted in partnership,3 but on 
the international level, a swift and sharp increase in collaboration can be 
dated to September 18, 1997.  On that date, American media mogul Ted 
Turner announced his intention to make a huge donation to the U.N.—
up to one billion dollars, to be made in ten annual gifts of about one 
hundred million dollars each.4 
 
 3. This fact is particularly notable in the domestic policy sphere.  For an account and critique 
of the growth of certain types of partnerships, including public funding of privately-run prisons and 
schools, see Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:  Accounting for the New Religion, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003).  She concludes with a recommendation in accordance with the 
conclusions of this Article:  “Rather than trumpeting privatization or marching against it, scholars 
and activists should demand closer study of the strengths and weaknesses of existing accountability 
mechanisms that govern private markets, governmental bodies, and nonprofits, as well as of the new 
opportunities and dangers posed by collaborations across these sectors.”  Id. at 1262-63. 
 4. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary General, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/53/700 (Nov. 24, 1998) [hereinafter UNFIP Preliminary 
Report], available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/relationship_a-53-700.pdf. The most 
substantive discussion of the Foundation’s activities to date remains Stacy Williams’ prescient Note, 
A Billion Dollar Donation:  Should the United Nations Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth?, 27 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 425 (1999) (concluding, with some caveats, that it should not).  As she explains, 
Turner could not donate directly to the U.N. because such contribution is contrary to the U.N. 
Charter.  Id. at 435-36 (citing U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 2, art. 3, art. 4, para. 1). 
3
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Turner’s gift—which represented a large contribution even by the 
standards of the United Nations, the world’s most important 
international organization, and a relatively well-funded one5—attracted 
considerable press attention and a quick response from U.N. officials.  
Within months, Turner established the United Nations Foundation 
(Foundation), organized as a charity under U.S. law, to receive and 
administer his gift.6  The Foundation acted in concert with the U.N.’s 
Secretary-General and Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions to establish a dedicated “interface” organization for 
Turner’s Foundation.7  This interface organization was and is called the 
U.N. Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP).8  A formal agreement 
between the Foundation and the U.N. sealed this basic relationship, and 
the parties agreed on initial procedures for distribution of Foundation 
funding.9 
Turner’s announcement came at a propitious time for the U.N., 
which was in the grips of a financial and political crisis.10  Its largest 
donor-state, the U.S., had been withholding dues for partisan political 
reasons, and stood over one billion dollars in arrears.11  Following this 
lead, other member-states refused to remain current on dues, and the 
lack of financial support threatened to hamper the organization’s ability 
to accomplish its mission—and thus to exacerbate its political 
problems.12 
Turner desired to support the U.N.’s substantive work, but he also 
intended his gift to be used to advocate for the U.N. both in the United 
States and abroad.13  Through the gift, Turner asserted that the U.N. 
 
 5. The Foundation’s total gifts each year have amounted to slightly less than ten percent of 
the core U.N. operating budget, although this budget is supplemented by numerous special 
programs and assessments.  MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS:  THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 133 (2004) (reporting 
“U.N. System Expenditures”). 
 6. See I.R.C. 501(c)(3); U.N. Foundation, THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND, 
http://www.unfoundation.org/donate/cerf.html (“As a 501(c)(3) public charity, contributions made 
to the UN Foundation are tax deductible for U.S. donors.”) (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 7. UNFIP Preliminary Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 3, 6. 
 8. Id. Summary.  The original name of the fund was the “United Nations International 
Partnership Trust Fund.” Id. 
 9. Id.  Annex.  The agreement was signed on June 12, 1998.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 10. See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 135-36. 
 11. Id.  (“In the late 1990s, the U.N. faced by far its most serious financial crisis. . . .  The 
United States was by far the biggest debtor, owing $1.6 billion.  The financial crisis . . . illustrated 
the tension between demands for governance and institutional weakness.”). 
 12. See id. at 135-37. 
 13. UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION, UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS 7 (2003) 
[hereinafter U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS]. 
4
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deserved to be taken seriously, and, more subtly, indicated that donating 
to and through it might bring some of the benefits major philanthropists 
seek—including easy publicity, the infrastructure and experience crucial 
to interventions in troubled regions and on large scales, and enough 
normative legitimacy to cover more flexible, free, and aggressive project 
design.14 
As they have from the start, Turner and his close associates wield 
immense power through the Foundation.  The Foundation is run by a 
Board of Directors and a small executive staff; Timothy Wirth, former 
Representative and Senator from Colorado, has served as the first and 
only President of the Foundation,15 and Turner remains the Chairman of 
the Board.16  Even aside from his preeminent place in the institutional 
structure of the Foundation, Turner’s continued importance to the 
venture is assured because he is not legally bound to continue providing 
the funding he has promised to the Foundation.17  The initial plan to 
offer ten annual gifts of one hundred million dollars each would have 
brought Turner’s role in bankrolling Foundation activities to an end in 
 
 14. See Inge Kaul, Exploring the Policy Space Between Markets and States:  Global Public-
Private Partnerships, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE:  RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 231 
(Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceicao eds., 2006) (discussing some benefits of working with public 
organizations, including:  “economies of scale,” “visible impact,” “a delivery network in place,” 
“protect[ing] the company against the potential risks,” and “reputation spillover” (“[b]eing seen as 
an accepted peer of a respected public actor in a sustained partnership [which is] . . . an effective, 
relatively low-cost way of signaling social or environmental concern”)).  Kaul comments, regarding 
this last reason: 
Partnering with a public agent may . . . confer a social license to operate on the private 
corporation.  This motivation undoubtedly explains the increase in private to public 
contracting out of projects in which private agents lack the support of local communities, 
as is the case with many oil companies and other corporations in the extractive 
industries. 
Id. 
 15. Timothy E. Wirth, Disinfectants, Nudes, and Other Adventures, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 15, 15 n.aa1 (2002). 
 16. U.N. Foundation, ABOUT UNF, OUR BOARD, http://www.unfoundation.org/about-unf/our-
board (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
 17. It is of course conceivable that a remedy sounding in contract or promissory estoppel 
might be available against Turner if he failed to pay promised sums, especially on a specific project 
where a partner had relied on promised Foundation funding.  But I have found no document 
suggesting he is bound to pay up to the overall goals, and his statements on the subject seem 
sufficiently conditional, at least on his continued financial success, that the pledge seems likely 
more a moral than a legal obligation.  (Indeed, as noted, Foundation funding has already changed 
significantly in its substance from the initially announced gift structure.)  See Mary Francis Budig et 
al., Pledges to Non-Profit Organizations:  Are They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 
U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 51-85 (1992) (outlining various theories of the “enforceability of charitable 
pledges” from case law and secondary sources, noting ongoing doctrinal confusion, but tentatively 
identifying a  trend toward enforcement of promises that meet certain conditions, even in absence of 
consideration or reliance, on public policy grounds). 
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2008, but as this cutoff approached, his strategy shifted.18  Now he is 
highly “leveraging” Foundation funding with donations from other 
partners, so that his remaining donations (he has given just under seven 
hundred million dollars so far19) can be spread out over another ten 
years. 
Thus, Turner retains close control over the Foundation.  It could be 
characterized as a charitable alter ego of Turner, not meaningfully 
separate from him, subject only to the minimal legal constraints required 
for charitable organizations to maintain tax-exempt status.  In this way, 
the Foundation resembles the Gates Foundation, in that not just the 
founder’s wealth but also the founder’s (or in the case of Bill and 
Melinda Gates, the founders’) vision remains crucial to the foundation’s 
activities.20  There is nothing particularly surprising, and certainly 
nothing perverse, about this arrangement.  Both the U.N. Foundation and 
the Gates Foundation are widely recognized as responsible, professional, 
and in many ways exemplary;21 the impact of their ten-figure 
contributions to global issues is impressive and enduring.  In addition, 
their transparency regarding decisionmaking and finances and their use 
of evaluative mechanisms for assessing the effects of their activities22 
are admirable compared to most foundations.  They have helped 
establish a high bar for best practices in major, internationally-oriented 
philanthropies.  But caution is warranted when instead of simply 
donating their own money, they influence the policy decisions and 
 
 18. Caroline Preston, Ten Years Later, Turner’s U.N. Fund Continues to Evolve, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, June 12, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-
files.org/pdf/articles/cp_6122008.pdf. 
 19. Id. at 1-2. 
 20. Editorial, What has the Gates Foundation Done for Global Health?, 373 LANCET 1577 
(2009) (criticizing the Gates Foundation's lack of transparency in goal-setting, as the organization is 
dominated by the “whimsical governance principle” of following Gates family preferences). 
 21. They maintain and publicize their relatively transparent finances, they submit themselves 
to independent evaluation, and they espouse an ethos of responsiveness to criticism.  See, e.g., 
UNFIP Preliminary Report, supra note 4, Annex.  Even so, further scrutiny remains of utmost 
importance, all the more so because, as one expert puts it, “the new ethos of openness has obscured 
to some extent serious critical evaluations of foundation performance.  With their tremendous 
resources directed outward [i.e., to project a professional, objective, and competent image], 
foundations now control their image more fully than ever before. . . .  [O]penness and 
professionalism hardly guarantee that foundation resources are being used effectively and 
creatively.”  Peter Frumkin, Private Foundations as Public Institutions:  Regulation, 
Professionalization, and the Redefinition of Organized Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPIC 
FOUNDATIONS:  NEW SCHOLARSHIP, NEW POSSIBILITIES 69, 94 (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann ed., 
1999). 
 22. See, e.g., UNFIP Preliminary Report, supra note 4, Annex. 
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dramatically rearrange the priorities of public international organizations 
such as the U.N. 
The Foundation’s U.N. liaison, UNFIP, operates under some 
supervision by the U.N.  UNFIP is run by a Board of Advisors appointed 
by the Secretary-General and chaired by a Deputy Secretary-General.23  
The Board consists of U.N. officials and a few independent members 
from academia, foundations, and development organizations.24  As with 
other U.N. agencies, UNFIP faces occasional audits, and its programs 
remain subject to U.N. accounting guidelines.25  Its operations were 
once subject to criticism by the U.N. Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (interestingly, the criticism 
came out in favor of less procedural caution in grant decisions).26  It 
provides yearly reports to the General Assembly.  Recently, a new 
overarching entity, the U.N. Office for Partnerships, has emerged to take 
over the role of general partnership-liaison office for the U.N., a role 
previously played by UNFIP.27  And because the Office for Partnerships 
appears to be taking on more of the general partnership work once 
coordinated through UNFIP,28 it may develop increased supervisory 
capacity over UNFIP.  But for the moment, the two organizations seem 
hardly distinct at all, sharing significant staff and functions.  (This 
Article’s proposed Office of Independent Review could be housed in the 
Office for Partnerships, and because the partnership office seems to be 
 
 23. See U.N. Fund for International Partnerships:  Advisory Board, 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/YAdvisoryBoardPage.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See U.N. Secretary-General, Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations: 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin, U.N. ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 2003). 
 26. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary General, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/58/173 (Aug. 18, 2003) [hereinafter UNFIP Fifth Year 
Report] (The ACABQ “observed that UNFIP’s monitoring process appeared to be onerous and 
bureaucratic and that the time had come to assess and streamline the whole process.”), available at 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/fifthA-58-173.pdf. 
 27. The first report issued in the name of the Office for Partnerships explained its evolution as 
a function of the unexpected success of the partnership model initially established by Turner’s 
philanthropy.  Office for Partnerships 2007 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (“[O]wing to the success of 
UNFIP partnerships activities and Robert E. Turner’s philanthropic donation which paved the way 
for increased private sector engagement in United Nations causes, there has been an increasing 
demand for partnership advisory services by the Organization, State and non-State actors.  This has 
led to the evolution of the United Nations Office for Partnerships, which manages UNFIP, UNDEF 
as well as Partnership Advisory Services and Outreach.”).  Id.  The Office for Partnerships did not 
release a report at all in 2009, or thus far in 2010; at the time of writing, the 2007 report, released in 
2008, remains the most recently available report. 
 28. See U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Office for Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/63/257 (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Report], available at 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/english.pdf. 
7
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currently evolving, the timing is right for the introduction of new, 
structural accountability mechanisms such as this Article proposes.) 
Thus, despite these forms of rudimentary oversight, both UNFIP 
and the Office for Partnerships hold enviable positions.  Their work is 
done under color of the full authority of the U.N., but both have been 
almost entirely delegated the authority to make tactical or operational 
decisions concerning their partnerships, subject to a mere shadow of 
possible correction. 
As far as strategic goals, the mandate of the Foundation/UNFIP 
partnership was strikingly broad from the beginning—to support “U.N. 
causes.”29  This is a practically limitless mandate given the wide scope 
of U.N. activities.  The Foundation decided that its key focus areas 
would be “children’s health, women and population issues, 
environmental protection, and human rights/conflict prevention,”30 and 
these remain its top priorities.  Within these categories, it has developed 
narrower “programme frameworks” to describe the types of initiatives it 
is likely to support.31  Despite the amount of money involved, 
decisionmaking apparently remains relatively informal.  Foundation and 
UNFIP officials vet proposals from U.N. agencies and other partners, 
and the Foundation’s Board makes final funding decisions. 32  U.N. 
agencies have aggressively pursued Foundation funding from the start, 
and the process is competitive.33  As the direct liaison within the U.N. 
system, UNFIP secures the movement of funds from the Foundation to 
agencies and other implementing entities, as well as insuring financial 
accountability from funding recipients.34 
 
 29. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 7. 
 30. Id. at 13.  The final area, involving humanitarian aid and conflict prevention, developed 
latest and was only gradually formalized.  See UNFIP Fifth Year Report, supra note 26, ¶ 1 
(describing this area as an “evolving strategy”). 
 31. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships: 
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/54/664/Add.2 (Mar. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Population 
and Woman Program Framework] (offering the framework for the “Population and Women” 
initiative). 
 32. The Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/57/133 (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter UNFIP Fourth Year 
Report]. 
 33. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships: 
Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/55/763 (Feb. 5, 2001) [hereinafter UNFIP Third 
Year Report], available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/thirdyear_a-55-763.pdf. 
 34. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. A/60/327 (Nov. 15, 2005) (“As the administrative vehicle in the 
United Nations to support grant-making by the United Nations Foundation, UNFIP is responsible 
for approving the project documents submitted by United Nations implementing partners, 
requesting annual contributions for projects from the United Nations Foundation and making cash 
8
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Even early on, “the Foundation consider[ed] . . . raising new  
funds . . . among its primary activities,”35 and spoke of “leveraging 
additional resources.”36  The Five-Year Report of the Foundation 
asserted that from the first meetings, a “new kind of philanthropic 
enterprise was envisioned—a hybrid combining the missions of 
grantmaking, public affairs, and resource mobilization,”37 which was 
focused on the “central ideas of partnership, leverage, and advocacy.”38  
As noted, the success of these efforts and the consequent alteration in the 
frequency and amount of Turner’s donations39 means that as the tenth 
year of the Foundation came and went, Turner’s contributions did not 
run dry.  The remainder of Turner’s billion-dollar gift is to be spread out 
and “leveraged”—that is, used to solicit new partners who will add 
support.40  The goal is to squeeze at least two billion dollars’ worth of 
work from Turner’s one billion dollar donation.41 
The importance of UNFIP and the Foundation in building the 
U.N.’s partnership capacity is unquestionable.  It reflects the remarkable 
amount of influence that a large, well-publicized, and savvily 
administered gift can have, even on an organization as sprawling as the 
U.N.  From its earliest reports, UNFIP proclaimed its interest in 
evolving into a broader partnership liaison office.42  As it passed its 
tenth anniversary, it accomplished the goal, spawning the Office for 
 
remittances to the implementing partners.”) [hereinafter UNFIP Seventh Year Report], available at 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/seventhA-60-327.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships and the __ [Party name to be filled 
in], art. VI.4 (“Relation between the parties”),  http://www.un.org/unfip/docs/ 
UNFIP_MODEL_MOU.pdf [hereinafter Sample Memorandum]. (“Implementation and Use of 
Funds”) (“To the extent possible and consistent with U.N. Regulations and Rules, UNFIP shall 
recover and return to the Foundation all misused funds.”).  Id. 
 35. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/54/664 (Dec. 10, 1999) [hereinafter UNFIP Second Year 
Report] (“The UNFIP/[Foundation] effort has evolved considerably over the course of its second 
year of operations.”), available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/secondyear_a-54-664.pdf. 
 36. Id. 
 37. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 19. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Preston, supra note 18, at 1-2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Press Release, U.N. Foundation, Ted Turner’s United Nations Foundation Delivers $1 
Billion to U.N. Causes, Foundation Makes New Commitment to Leverage Another $1 Billion U.N. 
Press Release (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.unfoundation.org/media_center/press/ 
2006/pr_101006.asp. 
 42. See, e.g., UNFIP Third Year Report, supra note 33, ¶ 46 (“The UNFIP-[Foundation] 
partnership has evolved considerably over the course of its third year of operation.”); UNFIP 
Second Year Report, supra note 35, ¶ 25 (“The UNFIP/[Foundation] effort has evolved 
considerably over the course of its second year of operations.”). 
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Partnerships to which some of its roles are now entrusted.  As noted, the 
Office for Partnerships is now the gateway provider of partnership 
expertise to potential entities in the U.N. and outside of it.43  But with 
several overlapping staff and officers between UNFIP and the Office for 
Partnerships, UNFIP’s deep involvement in the project of building U.N. 
partnerships remains clear.44  Furthermore, the Office for Partnerships’ 
advising capacity was built while it was part of UNFIP.45  In a 2004 
report, UNFIP noted that it “is increasingly becoming a service provider 
to the United Nations system in its facilitator role with private 
companies and civil society.  Particularly in the last two years, there has 
been a significant increase in the number of enquiries for partnership 
assistance.”46  This trend has held.  The number of “substantive 
enquiries” surpassed four hundred only two years later,47 and by 2007, 
the number was “almost 700.”48 
In sum, and largely thanks to Turner and his organization, the U.N. 
is increasingly trusted by potential donors and partners and viewed as a 
reliable conduit for philanthropic investment.  UNFIP and now the 
Office for Partnerships point to their experience in administering over a 
billion dollars’ worth of total gifts through Foundation partnerships, 
most of the funding of which did not come from the Foundation itself 
 
 43. UNFIP’s eighth report explained that “[t]he partnership with the United Nations 
Foundation has enabled UNFIP to evolve into the partnership office of the United Nations.  It 
provides advisory and facilitation services to United Nations system organizations and a one-stop 
shopping centre for potential external partners with the United Nations.” U.N. Secretary-General, 
Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/61/189 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter UNFIP Eighth Year Report], available at 
http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/UNFIP%202005%20Report%20-%20A-61-189.pdf.  The 
Office of Partnerships, in the second report issued under its own name, used similar language to 
describe its role.  See 2008 Report, supra note 28, ¶ 15. 
 44. See id. Annex I. 
 45. For instance, UNFIP was involved in tsunami relief efforts in 2005-2007, when “[t]he 
United Nations Foundation . . . leveraged significant partner funding by expanding its fiduciary role 
in partnerships with organizations such as the American Red Cross and other charitable and 
commercial entities and by facilitating direct contribution from the general public.”  UNFIP Eighth 
Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 45.  This work seems to have been accomplished in large part simply 
by making the managerial, accounting, and development resources of the Foundation and UNFIP 
available to partners and donors.  UNFIP’s capacity proved useful in other situations:  “In light of 
its ability to provide fast track programme management processes and expeditious administrative 
support and oversight, UNFIP was tasked with the establishment and executive management of the 
new fund for democracy-building efforts worldwide, UNDEF.”  UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra 
note 43, ¶ 70; see also id. ¶ ¶ 49-50. 
 46. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Fund for International Partnerships:  Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. A/59/170 (July 23, 2004) [hereinafter UNFIP Sixth Year 
Report], available at http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/sixthA-59-170.pdf. 
 47. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 52. 
 48. 2008 report, supra note 28, ¶ 5. 
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but from its many partners.49  The U.N.’s partnership capacities now 
include the coordination of U.N. entities with governments, for-profit, 
and nonprofit actors; the administration of large scale financing and 
logistics for global projects; and, just as importantly, the provision of 
U.N. bona fides and largely favorable publicity to donors and partners.50  
All of this capacity—which has been well noted in the donor/partner 
pool, judging from the precipitous rise in “substantive enquiries”51—
derives ultimately from Turner’s gift and the U.N.’s active embrace of it.  
Established partnerships like that between the Foundation and UNFIP 
provide tested and reliable models, and the Foundation has not hesitated 
to claim its share of credit for the evolving partnership model.  Timothy 
Wirth noted about his organization that “[w]e have become . . . a kind of 
broker for the increasing number of people in the private sector who 
want to engage with the UN.”52  Institution building may be just as 
lasting a legacy as the substantive projects of the Foundation, and the 
Foundation and UNFIP have adjusted their methods and aims in light of 
this fact.  They have, in essence, realized that the role of “influential 
partnership broker” represents a significant enhancement even over the 
role of “well-heeled partner.”  As they approached their tenth year, 
UNFIP and the Foundation reconceived their role to be one of 
facilitation and coordination of additional partnerships.53 
In sum, the Foundation/UNFIP partnership has initiated changes in 
the nature, organization, and functioning of the U.N., as in similarly 
situated international organizations.  The change has the potential to help 
the U.N. achieve some of its most ambitious goals—but also to make the 
organization vulnerable to capture.  Powerful partners play a significant 
and increasing role in the work of the U.N. and on the international stage 
more generally.  And partnership facilitators have gained a toehold 
within the hierarchy of organizations. 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 28. 
 50. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. 
 51. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 52. 
 52. Timothy E. Wirth, Remarks Before the U.S. Institute of Peace Task Force on the United 
Nations (Apr. 25, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-
files.org/unf_website/PDF/speeches/USIPremarks.pdf.). 
 53. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 66 (“The difference in the level of grant 
approvals between the seventeenth [$46.3 million] and the eighteenth [$1.5 million] funding rounds 
[the 2005 funding rounds] reflects a new way of operating by the United Nations Foundation.  
Rather than invest exclusively in projects or programmes, the United Nations Foundation Board 
decided to consolidate future investments by thematic area and use their core resources to build 
partnerships and lead advocacy campaigns in support of key themes.”). 
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These developments are evaluated from a critical perspective in the 
following Part of this Article.  For now, it suffices to note that the 
Foundation’s development and relations with the U.N. have challenged 
the U.N. system to evolve.  Partnership activities are increasingly 
important within the U.N.  Foundation/UNFIP activities have had the 
effect of bringing about significant growth in the U.N.’s capacity to 
provide legal and logistical support to multi-party efforts involving new 
types of hybrid entities and coordinated teams (public/private, 
profit/nonprofit).  Some of these changes were anticipated at the 
establishment of the Foundation and UNFIP, and still more have arisen, 
with unanticipated strength, over time.  Apart from substantive 
contributions to the environment, security, children’s health, and 
reproduction/population issues, Turner has contributed both procedural 
templates and a measure of goodwill for partnership-type activities with 
the U.N. system and among potential partners. 
This Part has focused on Turner’s gift, and the remarkable short- 
and long-term effects it has had on the U.N.  The Foundation, however, 
is not a lone actor.  It provides only one important example of a much 
broader phenomenon:  a sharp rise in public-private partnerships in 
public international organizations.54  Numerous public international 
organizations, especially those dealing with development, have in their 
own ways heightened their engagement with partners.55  But the 
 
 54. See Kaul, supra note 14, at 219 (developing elaborate definition and classification of 
global public-private partnerships, based on empirical work); id. at 239-41 (answering the question 
of whether the phenomenon of public-private partnerships is a “[f]ad or fixture?” in favor of the 
latter); Ian Broadwater & Inge Kaul, Global Public-Private Partnerships:  The Current Landscape 
(United Nations Development Programme/Office of Development Studies Working Paper, Feb. 
2005) (discussing evidence of the rise of partnerships). 
 55. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO), the public health arm of the U.N., 
which currently lists “Enhancing Partnerships” as one of its six top agenda items.  See THE WHO 
AGENDA, http://www.who.int/about/agenda/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).  They have 
also faced, and introduced some protections against, reputational costs arising from their partnership 
activities.  See, e.g., Press Release, WHO, Statement of the World Health Organization on 
Allegations of Conflict of Interest and “Fake” Pandemic (Jan. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/h1n1_pandemic_20100122/en/index.html 
(“WHO recognizes that global cooperation with a range of partners, including the private sector, is 
essential to pursue public health objectives today and in the future.  Numerous safeguards are in 
place to manage conflicts of interest or perceived conflicts of interest among members of WHO 
advisory groups and expert committees.”).  See also Thomas C. Dawson & Gita Bhatt, The IMF and 
Civil Society Organizations:  Striking a Balance (2001), IMF Policy Discussion Paper, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2001/pdp02.pdf; International Monetary Fund, Factsheet: 
The IMF and Civil Society Organizations, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/civ.htm (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2010).  In addition, dozens of U.N. entities, particularly the larger ones, are 
developing their own specialized partnership offices and capacities.  See, e.g., International Labour 
Office (ILO) Committee on Technical Cooperation, Public-Private Partnerships, GB.301/TB/1 (Jan. 
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Foundation’s relationship with the U.N. was an early model for—and 
instigator of—this wider phenomenon of global partnerships, and it 
provides an apt illustration of benefits and possible drawbacks of the 
emerging partnership paradigm. 
III.  PROBLEMS OF “PARTNER CAPTURE” 
This Part presents dangerous downsides, for public international 
organizations, of the sharp rise of public-private partnerships, a rise 
illustrated here by the example of the partnership activities of the U.N. 
and Turner’s U.N. Foundation.  This Article coins “partner capture” as a 
general term to describe the dangers of a headlong rush into 
partnerships. 
The term partner capture derives from the concept of “agency 
capture” in the U.S. regulatory and administrative context, but as will 
become clear, partner capture covers a broader range of bureaucratic 
pathologies than agency capture.  The analysis here looks to a range of 
principles concerning the behavior of public agencies, interest groups, 
and other actors in regulatory processes—principles initially identified 
by legal scholars, economists, and political scientists writing in the areas 
of public choice, political economy, and administrative law.56 
 
28, 2008), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_090364.pdf.  See also Alison Kamhi, Note, Private 
Funding for Public Justice:  The Feasibility of Donations to the Cambodian Tribunal, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 581 (2007) (applying lessons from other public-private partnerships, including U.N. 
Foundation, to the international tribunal set up to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders; emphasizing 
financial transparency and the need to prevent donor manipulation of tribunal operations). 
 56. For introductions to the relevant concepts, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991), especially at 12-37 (“Interest Groups 
and the Political Process”), and 116-44 (“Integrating Public Choice and Public Law”);  Michael E. 
Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:  Toward 
a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).  For examples of “agency capture” and related 
concepts integrated into focused scholarly studies, see, for example, Clayton P. Gillette & James E. 
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1064-69 (1990) (discussing standard 
“capture theory”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339-46 
(2001) (outlining theories in the course of an assessment of a trend in greater presidential control of 
executive agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
421, 448-52 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 335, 336-39 (1974) (casting some doubt on suspicions of bureaucratic incompetence); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 
(1975) (providing critical historical overview of major trends, theories, and results of the first 
several “stages” of U.S. administrative legal structure, with a focus on judicial review); Thomas H. 
Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?:  Presidential Power, Congressional 
Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional 
Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 121-26 (1996) (modeling structures of decisionmaking 
applicable to U.S. government actors).  For an influential, more expansive account, see JERRY L. 
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This Part focuses on several distinct dimensions of partner capture:  
(A) agenda distortion, that is, the potentially disruptive agenda-setting 
power that heightened partnership activity brings with it; (B) intra-
organization rivalries, i.e., the structural effects that the competition for 
partnership funds and for control of joint activities might have on the 
organization as a whole; (C) reputational risks that flow from certain 
alliances or activities; and (D) erosion of legal immunity that might 
result from actions taken in concert with partners or with their agents. 
The theoretical basis of this critique is drawn from scholarship on 
agency failure and bureaucratic design initially developed to explain the 
pathologies of the modern administrative and regulatory state.  The 
application of these primarily public choice insights to international 
actors, such as international organizations, has been attempted only in 
fits and starts.  However, as this Article demonstrates, there is an 
ongoing need for political economic analysis of international 
organizations, international law, and global governance, particularly in 
the hyper-politicized, big business of development.57  As international 
law—or what is better termed the law, regulation, and administration of 
“global governance” regimes—continues to develop at the instigation of 
non-traditional (i.e., non-state) actors and in non-traditional (i.e., non-
treaty and non-“customary international law”) forms, it will continue to 
demand the attention of legal scholars wielding legal tools appropriate to 
complex, novel, and evolving problems.  Scholars, for instance those 
proposing a set of core accountability principles forming an emergent 
 
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE:  USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 
(1997) (extensive, contextualized application of public choice concepts in U.S. government 
structure and function, with a focus on administrative agencies, and with a normative push for 
extensive delegation, and well-developed checks). 
 57. See, e.g., Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International Organization, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:  A PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH 27, 36-
40 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991) (discussing political economy of international 
agencies' behavior as regards governments and interest groups);  Roland Vaubel, The Political 
Economy of the International Monetary Fund:  A Public Choice Analysis, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra, at 204 (providing an example of 
international organization behavior under conditions of expensive oversight, arguing that staff self-
interest determines at least certain organization policies); Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation 
Under Anarchy:  States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION 
& AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 41 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) 
(introducing basic concepts of principal-agent theory as applied to international organization).  
These are merely some starting-points; the remainder of the essays in both of the cited volumes 
provide useful frameworks and case studies.  See also Philip Jones, Taking Self-Interest into 
Account:  A Public Choice Analysis of International Cooperation, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: 
RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 304 (Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceicao eds., 2006) (providing 
background on international public choice, and on partnerships and other global collaborative 
forms); id. at 314-15 (discussing bureaucratic behavior). 
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“global public law” or “global administrative law,” have emphasized the 
need for process-based protections, interest-based analyses, and attention 
to internal institutional rules and accountability structures.58  This 
Article’s account of partner capture provides a concrete example 
supporting these scholars’ intuitions.  The Article’s proposal is an 
example of how academic observations can be applied in practice. 
For the purposes of this Article, a key analogy is between public 
international organizations and the traditional agents that much 
administrative law seeks to control:  the executive agencies responsible 
for regulating in the public interest in their given fields.  This analogy is 
apt because public international organizations—by contrast to many 
other NGOs and international organizations, and to private entities—
exist to advance the interests of their member-states, with responsibility 
delegated to them by these states on the basis of their expertise and 
ability to aggregate disparate interests in favor of collectively feasible 
and efficient solutions.  This ideal is never fully attained, but without a 
sense that international organizations operate on a basis of expert 
analysis responsive to the interests and aims of the member-states, their 
effectiveness and credibility are greatly undermined.59 
To further elaborate the dominant analogy of this Article, private 
partners such as the Foundation are akin to interest groups in traditional 
administrative law, in that they are entities that operate in the general 
field of an organization’s concern but on the basis of interests that are 
 
 58. See Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in MORAL 
UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167 (Henry R. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009) (“I 
argue that international law should be theorized as the law between public entities outside a single 
state . . . I focus . . . on the entities whose practice counts in making international law, on the 
processes whereby these entities make international law, and some implications about the content of 
international law.”); Benedict Kingsbury, Richard B. Stewart & Nico Krish, The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 34-35 (2005) (“Internal Mechanisms 
Adopted by Global Institutions for Participation and Accountability”); Benedict Kingsbury et al., 
Foreword:  Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to 
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005) (“Global Administrative Law 
encompasses the legal mechanisms, principles, and practices . . . that promote or otherwise affect 
the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet 
adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by 
providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make. . . .  This field of law is 
described as ‘global’ rather than ‘international’ to reflect . . . its foundation in normative practices, 
and normative sources, that are not encompassed with standard conceptions of ‘international 
law.’”); ALVAREZ, supra note 1, at 109-83 (“(Re) Introducing International Institutional Law”), 
184-256 (“The Varied Forms of International Institutional Law”); see also supra note 57. 
 59. See Mona M. Lyne et al., Who Delegates?  Alternative Models of Principals in 
Development Aid, in DELEGATION & AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 
3 (emphasizing the complexity, when dealing with international organizations, of specifying the 
principal whom the agent should obey). 
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not necessarily aligned with the public interest, the interest of the 
international organization in question, or the interest of its constituents 
(usually member-states).  As the literature on agency failure suggests, 
preserving the functioning of public bureaucracies requires careful 
attention to pathologies that will naturally develop in agencies, not due 
to bad faith on the part of agency officers but simply due to institutional 
pressures and predictable self-interested, utility-maximizing preferences. 
The questions that this Part seeks to answer are:  What sort of 
distorting effects the “pull” of private partnership money might have on 
the activities of public international organizations?  What are the dangers 
of partner capture? 
A. Agenda Distortion 
This sketch of partner capture problems for public international 
organizations begins with agenda distortion.  This problem is the most 
pressing and most difficult to detect pathology likely to arise from 
partnership arrangements.  As the following discussion shows, agenda 
distortion is pervasive, in that the other forms of distortion contribute to 
agenda distortion inefficiencies in an organization, which distract it from 
the goals it would otherwise pursue. 
The example of the U.N. and Ted Turner’s U.N. Foundation is 
again useful.  The operations of the Foundation, UNFIP, and the U.N. 
agencies “partnering” with them are far from separate.  They are 
thoroughly entangled.  The Foundation wields an immense amount of 
influence over project selection.  “Projects and activities were identified 
in conformity with the Foundation’s strategic objectives,”60 notes one 
report.  Another provides that “[e]ach Project Document shall be 
consistent with the terms and conditions of the corresponding project 
proposal package approved by the Foundation.”61  And of course final 
decisionmaking regarding funding remains in the hands of the 
Foundation’s Board of Directors.62  The agenda-setting and gatekeeper 
power of the Foundation is indubitable, and that is hardly surprising, as 
the Foundation supplies (or otherwise arranges) the lion’s share of 
 
 60. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1. 
 61. Sample Memorandum, supra note 34, art. II.2 (“Project Documents”). 
 62. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, ¶ 48.  Also of interest:  “Member States will 
recall that the programme framework on sustainable energy and climate change was endorsed by the 
UNFIP Advisory Board and the [Foundation] Board of Directors in late 2000 and was formally 
circulated by UNFIP to United Nations system partners in June 2001.” UNFIP Fifth Year Report, 
supra note 26, ¶ 25.  There does not seem to be any opportunity for comment or change by U.N. 
agencies or the General Assembly. 
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financing for most projects.  While UNFIP offers assurances that its 
procedures seek to “ensure the full participation of all stakeholders in 
decisionmaking,”63 the “participation of all stakeholders” will only go so 
far if final decisions are subject to approval by the Foundation’s board.  
All reasonable actors will attend carefully to that board’s preferences.  
Its priorities will dominate. 
The agenda distortion fear is not that the partner or its agents will 
actively exploit the international organization’s activities for personal 
gain—although the Oil-for-Food debacle of the 1990s, in which 
widespread incompetence combined with shrewd corruption led to 
scandal, serves as a reminder that organizations must remain vigilant 
against extreme abuses.64  The primary fear, rather, is that actors with 
sufficient money or influence may skew the goals of the organization 
away from the priorities its member-states and officers would otherwise 
prefer, and turn it instead toward the goals prized by that focused, 
motivated, external actor.65  This danger is more acute when, as with the 
U.N., it may be quite difficult to know when the organization’s activities 
are being distorted.  The mandate of the U.N. is extremely broad.66  
Agencies and officers have significant discretion to choose the activities 
they consider the best use of U.N. resources.  It is this balancing of 
priorities that partners might affect, and in a way not even necessarily 
detectable to the decisionmakers themselves, over time.  There are many 
arguably appropriate actions it could take in every area of global policy, 
and under current arrangements, its partners are likely to exercise 
disproportionate influence in determining which of the many available 
opportunities win out.  Partners have a megaphone that can drown out 
the sounds of the other interests whispering in the ear of agency 
decisionmakers.  Compounding this fear is the likelihood that, given the 
contrast between this broad mandate and the limited personnel and 
capacity of the U.N., initial “capture” would be magnified as 
bureaucratic inertia sets in.  That is, once an area becomes a focus, an 
agency develops expertise, contacts, and interest in that narrow area, and 
it will pursue projects in that area again.67 
 
 63. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, ¶ 49. 
 64. SIMON CHESTERMAN, THOMAS M. FRANCK & DAVID P. MALONE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS:  DOCUMENTS & COMMENTARY 558-63 (2008). 
 65. For comments and bibliography on agenda setting, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 
56, at 38-42 and accompanying notes. 
 66. U.N. Charter art. 1.  For an analysis generally in line with that offered here, see Williams, 
supra note 4, at 447-49 (endorsing caution by U.N. in accepting partners and partnerships). 
 67. Brennen Jensen, ‘Winging It’ for World Peace:  Additional Donors and a Knack for 
Teamwork Have Helped Ted Turner’s U.N. Charity Thrive, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 22, 
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The Foundation is but the tip of the iceberg, and by comparison to 
other partners it is a model of transparency and philanthropic idealism.  
UNFIP, and now its counterpart, the Office for Partnerships, seems 
motivated to secure funding from as many—and as wealthy—sources as 
possible.68  These activities put the U.N. at great risk of manipulation by 
organizations upon whose funding it will become dependent if it wants 
to continue growing and expanding its own range of partnership 
projects.  The long list of corporate partners inevitably raises suspicions 
concerning the motives and legitimacy of the cooperation of 
multinational corporations with the U.N.  Partnerships have been made 
with many of the largest and most powerful companies in the world, 
including Exxon,69 Citigroup,70 Wal-Mart,71 Marvel Comics,72 and 
Coca-Cola.73  Such partners, along with respected philanthropic 
foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation,74 supply both expertise 
and a great deal of money, and are thus indispensable to the trend toward 
partnership.75  A partnership with Vodafone, for instance, was intended 
to strengthen emergency communication capacity.76  An advantage of 
this type of model, as always with the involvement of private funding in 
public ventures, is the increased efficiency that results from a private 
corporation, which may be more results- and service-oriented than 
bureaucratic, politicized U.N. agencies.  That said, such corporations lay 
careful global strategies that include consideration of how philanthropic 
outlays can enhance business opportunities, and how they may yield less 
tangible benefits as well.  To embark on mutually beneficial partnerships 
 
2007, available at http://www.philanthropy.com/free/articles/v19/i09/09002201.htm (“The United 
Nations Foundation doesn’t just give money to the United Nations, it helps shape the projects inside 
the United Nations,” says Claudia Rosett, journalist-in-residence at the Foundation for the Defense 
of Democracies, a Washington think tank.  She adds, “The problem with that is that nobody elected 
Ted Turner.  He’s just rich.”). 
 68. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 53. 
 69. Id. ¶ 16. 
 70. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supra note 34, ¶ 44. 
 71. 2008 Report, supra note 28, ¶ 26. 
 72. Id. ¶ 21. 
 73. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 34 (“in tsunami-affected areas of Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.”). 
 74. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, ¶ 41. 
 75. As of the end of 2005, “[t]he cumulative amount of co-financing from other funding 
partners [aside from the Foundation] was $360.4 million, or more than one third of all approved 
grants.”  UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 1. 
 76. Id. ¶ 60 (“The partnership of the advisory committee of the Vodafone Group Foundation 
and United Nations Foundation/UNFIP held its first meeting in October 2005. . . .  The 
partnership’s primary goal is to combine Vodafone funding, knowledge and technology with United 
Nations Foundation funding, relationships and programmatic expertise.”). 
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is precisely the goal, and a laudable one, but it must be remembered that 
with active business entities, partnership discussions should be more 
“arm’s length” than might be necessary with dedicated philanthropic 
organizations whose interests are more likely to be aligned with those of 
the U.N.  The proposed Office of Independent Review in Part III of this 
Article would help guarantee non-captured review of proposed 
partnerships. 
Is there any reason to think that agenda distortion concerns are 
anything more than a theoretical concern?  Unfortunately, agenda 
distortion would be difficult to detect in many cases, because it enters at 
such a deep, structural level, of a decisionmaking process marked by 
considerable discretion.  Accordingly, it is a main argument of this 
Article that structural problems demand structural solutions, because ad-
hoc solutions cannot work when individual distortions are difficult or 
impossible to detect as they arise.77 
Still, several examples illustrate that agenda distortion is a very real 
issue.  One established facet of agenda distortion emerges from the 
“pull” of outsized foundation funding, and another from the lack of 
sufficiently specific “legislative” guidance from the U.N. member-states 
empowered to give it. 
The activities of the Gates Foundation provide the first example.  
The Foundation, the largest in the world, endowed by the fortunes of 
both Bill Gates and, recently, Warren Buffett,78 has been active in the 
realm of global health policy (among many other areas).  It has sought 
out creative, broad-based technical approaches to large-scale problems, 
and has been lauded for its results-based, analytical approaches.79  It 
partners with numerous organizations, including the WHO.80  However, 
it has also attracted bitter criticism for its tendencies to take aggressive 
 
 77. In this, it is no different from agency capture.  See, e.g., Protecting the Public Interest: 
Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight 
and the Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 5-8 (2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley, 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-03-10%20Bagley%20Testimony.pdf (explaining that “[t]he 
central problem with agency capture is that it is neither easily identifiable nor readily falsifiable.”). 
 78. Timothy L. O’Brien & Stephanie Saul, Buffett to Give Bulk of His Fortune to Gates 
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at A1. 
 79. The Gates’ Foundation’s willingness to explore risky possibilities, in particular, is 
consistent with experts’ conceptions of what foundations can uniquely add to policy problem-
solving.  See Frumkin, supra note 21, at 69 (“If successful, foundations can serve as laboratories for 
experimentation where new and controversial ideas can be put to the test.”). 
 80. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Gates Foundation's Influence Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2008. 
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action without taking account of the systemic effects of its projects.81  Its 
vast resources make its priorities and chosen approaches, practically 
speaking, irresistible to scientists and organizations in the global medical 
arena, and have often left dissenters out in the cold.82  That the Gates 
Foundation has arguably used its power for the most part rationally and 
innovatively hardly relieves the worry stimulated by its disproportionate 
and unaccountable power over the global development agenda in the 
arenas it chooses to enter. 
Another specifically grounded version of the “capture” criticism of 
the Foundation and its U.N. counterparts has been presented by the 
influential conservative academic Mary Ann Glendon, a Harvard law 
professor who has, among other positions, served as the head of the 
Vatican’s delegation to the Fourth U.N. Women’s conference in 1995.83  
In 1999, Glendon wrote that “economic pressures . . . may aggravate the 
danger of capture of U.N. agencies by well-financed special interests,” 
and she cited Turner’s then-young Foundation as an example:  an 
endowment that, upon further examination, “looks less like a gift and 
more like a take-over bid aimed at U.N. agencies with privileged access 
to vulnerable populations.”84  This suggestion was accompanied by 
biting personal criticism of both Turner and Foundation head Timothy 
Wirth for their alleged passion for population control of the poor.85 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (recounting bitter criticism, leveled by WHO's chief of malaria, of Gates Foundation 
malaria policy's effect on other research, treatment, and prevention efforts in the field); Robert E. 
Black et al., Accelerating the Health Impact of the Gates Foundation, 373 LANCET 1584, May 9, 
2009 (noting Foundation's outsize influence in global health policy arena, encouraging move to less 
risky, more efficiently lifesaving strategies); Ann Danaiya Usher, Dispute Over Pneumococcal 
Vaccine Initiative, 374 LANCET 1879 (discussing charities, including Gates-related entities, 
engaging in distortion of reports and pursuing illogical solutions); David McCoy et al., The Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation’s Grant-making Programme for Global Health, 373 LANCET 1645, May 
9, 2009 (analyzing and criticizing Gates Foundation grant-making practices).  See especially id. at 
1650 (“All the key contributors to global health have an association with the Gates Foundation 
through some sort of funding arrangement.  Coupled with the large amount of money involved, 
these relations give the foundation a great degree of influence over both the architecture and policy 
agenda of global health.”). 
 83. See Barbara Crossette, Vatican Picks U.S. Woman As Delegate to U.N. Parley, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 25, 1995), at A3; “Biography,” http://glendonbooks.com/biography.html (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2009). 
 84. Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights:  The Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J. 
JURIS. 1, 11 (1999). 
 85. She wrote:  
A case in point is CNN founder Ted Turner’s $1 billion “gift” to the U.N. announced in 
the fall of 1997.  . . .  [T]his infusion of funds would have ranked behind the annual 
contributions of only the U.S., Japan, and Germany.  The news seemed too good to be 
true.  It was.  It soon appeared that the U.N. would not have control over the funds.  
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The more alarmist edge of Glendon’s critique falls short,86 and has 
not been borne out in the decade since it was written.  Wirth’s leftward 
leanings are no secret,87 but no evidence points to his being far out of the 
mainstream.  As for Turner, he explored direct contribution to the U.N. 
but was not “as an individual, able to directly donate to the United 
Nations.”88  As noted, a significant amount of Foundation funding goes 
directly into U.N.-wide publicity and promotion.  And, importantly, 
most current Foundation projects are in line with existing U.N. priorities 
and lack strong political overtones. 
The “women and population” portfolio is, however, politically 
sensitive, and it drives Glendon’s critique.  UNFIP’s description of the 
project runs thus: 
Projects [in the “women and population portfolio”] approved in 
2004 focused on promoting the participation rights of adolescent 
girls, supporting policy advocacy relating to reproductive health, 
improving the quality of reproductive health care, and 
strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to ensure a steady 
supply of essential reproductive health supplies to developing 
countries worldwide.89 
 
Rather, its agencies would be required to submit proposals for approval by a foundation 
headed by a man Mr. Turner chose because “he thinks as I do.”  The man . . . is former 
U.S. State Department official Timothy Wirth, who spearheaded the aggressive U.S. 
population control agenda at the 1994 Cairo conference.  Wirth has been so zealous in 
advocating population control that he has even praised China, with its coercive one-
child-per-family policy, for its “very, very effective high-investment family planning.”  
As for Mr. Turner, he told a California audience in 1998 that in the post-Cold War 
world, “The real threat is no longer an army marching on us, it’s people infiltrating us, 
you know, people that are starving.” 
Id. 
 86. For one, Glendon understates Wirth’s qualifications by failing to mention his service in 
the United States Senate.  Wirth, supra note 15, at 15 n.aa1.  Her further claims largely lack 
documentary support; the sources provided for the fragmentary, out-of-context quotations of Turner 
and Wirth are insufficient.  The China quotation is pulled from a Weekly Standard attack, itself 
unsourced, on several Clinton administration figures, including Wirth; the quotation is a mere 
fragment there as well.  Jeffrey Gedmin, Clinton’s Touchy-Feely Foreign Policy, WEEKLY 
STANDARD, May 13, 1996, at 19.  The Turner quotation about the “real threat” is from a New 
Yorker “Talk of the Town” fluff piece, and seems to be overblown rhetoric—Turner is a notorious 
loose cannon in his public comments—used to advance his position on nuclear proliferation, not 
developing-world population control.  Ann Bardach, Turner in 2000?  The Media Mogul Converts 
Some Rich People, NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 1998, at 37. 
 87. See, e.g., Timothy E. Wirth, President, The United Nations Foundation, The Need for 
Philanthropic Advocacy, Global Philanthropy Forum Conference on Borderless Giving (June 6, 
2003). 
 88. Jensen, supra note 67. 
 89. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supra note 34, ¶ 15. 
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The efforts have taken place in India, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, 
Nepal, Peru, and the United Republic of Tanzania.90  The Foundation, 
UNFIP, and their partner agencies have also embarked upon 
“reproductive health care” initiatives in Kosovo.91  UNFIP reports have 
asserted that “[r]eliable access to contraceptives and other commodities, 
such as condoms, HIV/AIDS test kits and equipment for emergency 
obstetric care, is a fundamental requirement for reproductive health.”92   
Components of this initiative offend some on moral grounds, but 
those offended currently appear to be a minority—a fact for which the 
Foundation bears no blame.  Its projects remain within the mainstream 
of international aid efforts, efforts in this case apparently designed to 
empower young women (for whom early marriage or child-bearing are 
strongly correlated with destitution) and protect those at grave medical 
risk from HIV/AIDS and other diseases.93  In the face of the situation of 
young women in states lacking readily available medical facilities or 
counseling services, Foundation activities hardly reveal a desire to “buy” 
the U.N. for nefarious purposes. 
That said, it is true that UNFIP notes religious or morally based 
objections only dismissively:  “Obstacles to achieving equality include 
 . . . harmful traditional, religious and cultural beliefs.”94  Glendon is 
right that the Foundation’s activities have enhanced the functioning of 
the U.N.’s pre-existing policies and activities in the area she finds 
objectionable.  Glendon here provides an example of precisely the sort 
of agenda distortion partner capture that this Article suggests will arise.  
She accurately identifies an area of agenda influence that the Foundation 
has had over U.N. programs, in one of its chosen areas of emphasis.  
Further, the Foundation’s involvement and its promise of independent 
funding may have lowered the U.N.’s responsiveness to concerns such 
as those Glendon and others might raise, tilting the scales away from 
political sensitivity and toward active intervention.95 
 
 90. Id. ¶ 18. 
 91. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, ¶ 12. 
 92. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supra note 34, ¶ 17. 
 93. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 20 (“Young women in Africa aged 15 to 24 
are two and a half times more likely to be infected by HIV/AIDS than young men of the same age.  
With the rapid spread of the epidemic in Africa, young married girls are now the group most 
vulnerable to infection by older, sexually active husbands.”). 
 94. Population and Woman Program Framework, supra note 31, ¶ 24; see also id. ¶ 43 
(“Additional constraints include opposition to aspects of reproductive health.”). 
 95. In this case, even the name of the program, “women and population,” might seem—as if 
masking some quasi-Malthusian plot—to view aid to women instrumentally, as a means to the end 
of population control, and thus this name seems out of place in light of the practical human needs 
being fulfilled, which might incidentally ease some global population difficulties, but which is 
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While most observers might favor the tilt in this case, future 
“tilting” might swing the other way, and to much more extreme positions 
than the largely mainstream ones pursued by the Foundation.  
Substantive outcomes do not excuse procedural sloppiness.  Safeguards 
against extremism should be desirable to all. 
In the end, although Glendon unfairly attacks Turner’s “gesture” as 
a mere “take-over bid,” it is hard to argue with the claim that the shift to 
partnership funding and activities represents, in Glendon’s words, a sort 
of “testing for the U.N. if its prestige and organizational resources are 
not to be, literally, for sale.”96  Glendon’s point supports the argument 
that, in the partnership context, U.N. entities may be willing to approach 
their tasks differently, if not always on a substantive policy level then at 
least on the level of rhetoric and process, when given cover by partners.  
If this is true, this is a loss of independence that should worry 
international organizations. 
All this admitted, and with agenda distortion worries given full 
airing, the question still arises:  How does partner capture distortion 
differ from the types of agenda distortion already built into U.N.?  The 
U.N.’s “democracy deficit” is often discussed, without any remedy in 
sight.97  And, by contrast to many inscrutable actors within the U.N. 
(including its most powerful body, the Security Council), the Foundation 
transparently promulgates annual reports and publicizes its aims,98 
making them easy to subject to public discussion.  While the danger of 
capture may be endemic to the U.N., it may not be fatal to the U.N.’s 
overall effectiveness, including in partnership situations.  If the choice is 
between, on the one hand, carefully policing the U.N.’s partnerships for 
manipulation or self-dealing but allowing the partnerships to continue, or 
 
absolutely certain to lead to other desirable outcomes such as opportunities for education and 
employment as well as lowered risks of abuse and disease.  A better chosen name might give a more 
accurate impression of the types of programs that the Foundation, the U.N., and their partners have 
supported—programs which are largely unobjectionable, and desperately needed.  This is the way 
the “programme framework” presents the issue, with humanitarian concerns foremost, followed by 
a note that population issues are secondary benefits that would lead to long-term humanitarian 
benefits.  See, e.g., Population and Woman Program Framework, supra note 31, ¶ 22 (“Helping to 
fulfil [sic] the human rights of adolescent girls is an area of emphasis both because of the 
improvements it can make in the lives of individual girls, and because of its important consequences 
for human and economic development.”). 
 96. Glendon, supra note 84, at 11.  
 97. See THOMAS D. ZWEIFEL, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRACY:  
ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICS, AND POWER 59-84, 82 (2006) (concluding that absent significant 
international political restructuring, “the U.N. is likely to remain as it is today:  not a quasi-
government, but a place where sovereign states can negotiate their interests.”). 
 98. UNFIP Preliminary Report, supra note 4, ¶ 23, Annex. 
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on the other hand greatly restricting the mandate and capabilities of the 
U.N. to enter partnership, who could in good conscience choose the 
latter?  Partners bring a lot to the table.  And U.N. entities address too 
many urgently pressing needs to restrict involvement in such situations.  
While it may be true that much of the private funding behind such 
efforts would still be dedicated to aid even without U.N. involvement 
(e.g., by the Red Cross), both the scope of the U.N. as an organization 
and the inclusive global ideals it represents militate in favor of it being 
an umbrella organization for aid efforts where possible.  Any solution to 
partner capture problems should take care not to hinder the positive 
aspects of partnerships when it seeks to curb the negatives. 
One solution to agenda distortion would be to ramp up the 
“legislative” guidance given by the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, and other relevant member committees within the U.N. system, 
to “executive” actors in U.N. agencies and the Secretariat.99  This 
solution would evoke a different set of administrative law principles, 
under which U.N. agencies would merely be “transmission belts” for 
putting “legislative” guidance into action.100  However, this possible 
solution seems likely to face the same unhappy fate suffered by the 
analogous U.S. model:  near-total neglect.  This solution would involve a 
much greater commitment by members to funding the programs they 
specify, because foundations and other entities will be less likely to 
participate if their input is not as central to decisionmaking.  It would 
also require significant steps to be taken toward the development of 
more representative models within the U.N., for instance, the 
development of weighted voting mechanisms to deal with the democracy 
deficit and ground decisions in popular will.  These are steps that might 
make many states uncomfortable, and would in any case require 
member-states to overcome inertia to a degree that seems unlikely.  Thus 
this option remains only a distant possibility. 
 
 99. See James Q. Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1967 at 3, 8 
(“When we define our goals, we are implicitly deciding how much, or how little, of a bureaucracy 
problem we are going to have.  A program with clear objectives, clearly stated, is a program with a 
fighting chance of coping with each of the many aspects of the bureaucracy problem.  Controlling 
an agency is easier when you know what you want.”). 
 100. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 437, 440 (“The traditional model’s answer was to treat the agencies essentially as subordinate 
adjudicatory bodies that are subject to close statutory and judicial control.  Administrative law 
functioned as a ‘transmission belt’ to legitimate the exercise of regulatory authority by ensuring, via 
judicial review, that particular impositions on private persons had been statutorily authorized by the 
democratically elected legislature.”). 
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In the end, there remains a very present danger of capture, of 
distortion of priorities, and of myopic focus on the pet causes of a given 
donor, particularly one as powerful as the Foundation.  There is no need 
to hold a Pollyannaish view of human nature or motivations.  Strategic 
behavior is inevitable.  Some U.N. agencies may pull punches in their 
criticisms of multinational corporations either because the agencies 
currently receive funding or because they hope to be part of 
Foundation/UNFIP partnerships.  Protections can be instituted against 
retaliation for such criticism, and this Article proposes a crucial 
structural protection, but the problem is always likely to persist to some 
degree.  We may doubt that UNFIP and Office for Partnerships 
guidelines, which claim as their “purpose . . . to facilitate the formulation 
and implementation of co-operation between the United Nations and the 
business community in a manner that ensures the integrity and 
independence of the Organization,”101 will be entirely successful at 
policing the activities of these sprawling, active organizations.  The 
current structure is ripe for manipulation, as it relies on a small number 
of agenda-setting decisionmakers, at least some of whose main 
qualification for the job is their willingness to put up money.  It is 
detailed analysis, competing political or philanthropic advocacy for 
other positions and agendas, and most of all, structural changes such as 
those proposed in Part III of this article, that will blunt the influence of 
any actors who would seek to overturn the proper priorities of an 
organization like the U.N., while still harnessing partnerships’ great 
capacity for furthering U.N. goals. 
B. Intra-Organization Rivalries 
The previous section dealt with the way in which external actors 
(the Foundation and its staff, Vodafone, Exxon, and so on) might 
manipulate the partnership relationship to impose their priorities on the 
U.N. agencies engaged in partnership activities, thereby distracting them 
from more pressing activities.  It asserted that structural changes are the 
appropriate first steps for the U.N. to take. 
This section deals with another potentially negative effect of greatly 
increased partnership activities, namely the way such partnerships can 
lead to strategic behavior on the part of entities or individuals within the 
 
 101. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidelines on Cooperation Between the U.N. and the Business 
Community (July 17, 2000), at 1 (Section II.6), available at 
http://www.un.org/unfip/docs/Guidelines_on%20UN_Business%20Cooperation.pdf [hereinafter 
Guidelines on Cooperation]. 
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organization, utilizing partnerships as opportunities for aggrandizement 
of themselves and their offices within the organization.  This empire-
building is especially worrisome in sprawling, relatively ill-defined 
bureaucracies like the U.N., but it will be a factor that any organization 
should consider before engaging with powerful partners. 
In the case of the U.N., for example, there are two directions in 
which the rivalries can develop:  There is (1) the vertical rivalry by 
which the Office of the Secretary-General, which plays the most 
important managerial role in the U.N.’s partnerships, could seek to 
consolidate its power over the organization by enhancing the 
prominence of partnership activities, an arena where it exerts 
disproportionate control; and (2) the horizontal rivalry by which entities 
or individuals within the U.N. could seek to aggrandize themselves, 
exert pressure on peer entities, and so on, by using their relationship to 
partners and exploiting the unique opportunities that high-powered 
partnerships present. 
As a backdrop, note that in considering whether rivalries will 
significantly disturb an organization’s health, the size of potential 
partnership activities is crucial.  The potential for partnerships must 
exert a significant “gravitational pull,” relative to the size and 
cohesiveness of the organization, before the intra-organizational rivalry 
effects are likely to reach a worrisome dimension.  In the case of the 
U.N., the size of partnerships relative to the size and cohesiveness gives 
grounds for worry.  Despite its visibility and sweeping mandate, the 
budget of the U.N. is modest, compared to the budgets of the 
governments of sovereign states or even municipalities—famously, the 
U.N.’s core operating budget is less than that of the Tokyo Fire 
Department.102  The core budget was approximately $1.25 billion in 
2001, and the entirety of additional resources from both voluntary and 
assessed contributions, for core, peacekeeping, and other agency 
activities, was less than ten billion dollars in 2000.103  In view of these 
figures, Turner’s gift, originally announced at approximately one 
hundred million dollars per year,104 is large.  Further, partnership 
funding is for discretionary purposes, whereas basic expenses and 
overhead consume most of the core budget.  Finally, in recent years the 
Foundation’s funding has been more than doubled by the involvement of 
 
 102. See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 137.  On U.N. financing more generally, see 
CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 201-34. 
 103. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 133. 
 104. UNFIP Preliminary Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
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other financial and operational partners.105  Little wonder then that the 
competition for grants has been stiff.106 
In view of increasing partnership activities, and the increasingly 
accepted role of partnerships in U.N. operations, there is little doubt that 
partnership funding exerts “gravitational pull” on the operation of U.N. 
actors.  In competing for partnership funding, agencies seem less and 
less “agents” of member-states than policy entrepreneurs fulfilling 
independent mandates.  The increasing numbers of partnership 
applications evinces the pull of partnerships, and the resultant horizontal 
rivalry concern is that U.N. agencies will sell out, or at least water down, 
their agenda in order to attain or retain the alliances with partners that 
bolster their place in the U.N. system—to the detriment of other 
agencies who would opt to forego some partners in order to preserve 
their mission.  Such rivalries might make coordinated efforts and 
multifaceted projects even harder than they already are within the 
fragmented U.N. system. 
Again, as with the agenda distortion discussed in the previous 
section, such problems would be hard to detect (no one will admit this, 
and it would be hard to prove), therefore again this Article argues that 
structural safeguards such as those presented in Part III should be 
implemented.  Intra-organizational rivalry problems are a manifestation 
of well-known agenda coordination (“system-wide coherence”) 
problems within the U.N. system, which have drawn extensive high 
level attention in the last decade, including multiple General Assembly 
resolutions, a report from the Secretariat, and findings from a high-level 
expert panel.107 
To a degree, UNFIP has already admitted its pull over U.N. 
agencies, as when it noted that “the U.N. Foundation has sought to help 
to bring the U.N. community together, fostering cooperation within and 
among agencies, and especially supporting U.N. efforts to encourage 
collaboration in the field.”108  The claim is striking:  an actor external to 
the organization claims responsibility for rearranging relationships 
among actors within that organization.  Stated optimistically, the 
Foundation may bring more rather than less unity, compared to the 
 
 105. 2008 report, supra note 28, ¶ 28. 
 106. See, e.g., UNFIP Third Year Report, supra note 33, ¶ 13. 
 107. See U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-up to General Assembly Resolution 63/311 on 
System-Wide Coherence Related to Operational Activities for Development:  Rep. of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/64/589 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/development_activities221209.pdf (essays analyzing history and 
theory of U.N. Secretariat). 
 108. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 14. 
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chaotic existing state of affairs within the U.N.  And the claim is 
plausible, given that the U.N. has long been known to struggle along as a 
set of “warring fiefdoms.”  As with the agenda distortion problem, it is 
possible that rivalry problems were already so pervasive that partnership 
pressures actually strengthen the organization by providing focus and 
rewarding at least rudimentary cooperation.  As outlined below, a virtue 
of the proposed Office of Independent Review is that it would not 
dampen these positive partnership effects but would enhance them by 
promoting more attention to potential efficiencies of inter-agency 
cooperation. 
By contrast to the difficulty of establishing where and when 
horizontal rivalry pathologies have developed, there is little doubt that 
the increasing prominence of partnerships has had vertical rivalry 
effects, for better or for worse.  Simply put, partnership activities 
significantly expand the power, within the U.N. system, of the Secretary-
General, and it strains credulity to think that the Secretariat has not, as a 
consequence, actively fostered the trend to partnership.  The Secretariat 
relies on few certain sources of power under the U.N. Charter, and it has 
been up to individual Secretaries to shape the office.109  Kofi Annan 
staked out clear ground for himself and his office, taking up much space 
in the public eye.  He argued that the work of the Secretary, and thus the 
work of the organization for which he was the “chief administrative 
officer,”110 was hindered by inadequate support from member-states, the 
Security Council, and the General Assembly.111  The Secretariat need 
not be a mere figurehead; rather, it has shown promise of being an entity 
that could take on an important coordination and agenda-setting role 
within the system. 
The Foundation, UNFIP, and the Office for Partnerships, are 
strongly aligned with the Secretariat.  As a matter of legal positioning, as 
noted above, the UNFIP was “[d]esigned as the operational arm of the 
 
 109. See CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 132-60 (summarizing responsibilities and 
capacities of the Secretary-General, pointing out tensions between conceptions of the office as more 
“secretary” or more “general”); KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 119-20 (noting the role of 
occupants of the office and offering a brief account of its developments and current status); 
SECRETARY OR GENERAL?  THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN WORLD POLITICS (Simon 
Chesterman ed., 2007). 
 110. U.N. Charter art. 97. 
 111. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom:  Towards Development, Security, 
and Human Rights for All:  Rep. of the Secretary- General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); 
CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 143-51 (appealing for greater resources and autonomy to be 
given to the Secretariat); KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 137 (noting ways, including 
partnerships, in which Kofi Annan sought to use his position to “creative[ly]” put the U.N. on better 
financial footing). 
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Secretary-General in its partnership with the United Nations 
Foundation.”112  The report on UNFIP’s 2004 operations noted 
revealingly “with the unprecedented response to the global commitments 
of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals 
from the private sector and civil society leaders all over the world, the 
Office of the Secretary-General will be increasingly accountable for 
facilitating their engagement and that of other constituencies.”113 
Time and again UNFIP and Office for Partnerships documents refer 
to the “priorities of the Secretary-General,”114 or to action taken “[i]n 
direct response to the Secretary-General’s call-to-action,”115 or to “a 
commitment that is consistent with the emphasis placed by the 
Secretary-General.”116  Documents refer to other agencies (UNDP, 
UNICEF, WHO, etc.), but always within the rubric of broad direction 
from the Secretary-General. 
By contrast, the main U.N. membership body, the General 
Assembly, as well as its associate committees, receives much different 
mention in partnership documents: 
Designed as the operational arm of the Office of the Secretary-
General in its partnership with the United Nations Foundation, 
UNFIP . . . continues to work with the intergovernmental 
machinery, including the General Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council.  UNFIP remains committed to playing a vital role 
in global partnership development within the Secretariat.117 
The phrase “intergovernmental machinery” revealingly sounds like a 
burden to be shrugged off—an obstructive, rusty bureaucratic apparatus 
compared to the energy and flexibility of the Secretary-General and 
UNFIP.  UNFIP reports and other partnership-related documents 
demonstrate that the Economic and Social Council and the General 
Assembly are marginal actors at best in partnership activities.  Member-
states, particularly the powerful and rich ones who enjoy holding the 
purse-strings and calling the shots for the U.N., may eventually become 
uncomfortable with the expansion of partnership activities if this trend 
broadens; they might even, in a sort of vicious cycle, view increased 
 
 112. UNFIP Seventh Year Report, supra note 34, ¶ 59. 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. ¶ 37. 
 115. UNFIP Fourth Year Report, supra note 32, ¶ 38. 
 116. UNFIP Sixth Year Report, supra note 46, ¶ 36. 
 117. UNFIP Eighth Year Report, supra note 43, ¶ 73. 
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partnership funding as an excuse to shift funding away from the U.N., to 
more responsive international organizations or to domestic organs.118 
As noted above, the extremely broad mandate of the U.N. provides 
the perfect opportunity for entities and individuals to steer the day-to-
day work in the direction they desire.119  In this case, it is strongly in the 
interest of the Secretary-General, who is otherwise dependent on the 
whims of member-state diplomacy and politics, to build mechanisms of 
funding and support that will allow his office to direct the broad and 
crucial work of the U.N. effectively. 
The Secretariat’s emerging priorities in this arena accord with a 
growing understanding among policy experts that development and 
security are linked not only to traditional “public goods” like legal 
systems but also to investment and private sector involvement.120  As a 
result, “[t]he relationship with the business community has become more 
important as the role of business in generating employment and wealth 
through trade, investment and finance has grown and as U.N. member 
states have increasingly stressed the importance of private investment in 
development.”121  Many partnerships serve the interests of the individual 
U.N. actors involved, whose role within the organization is strengthened 
by the emphasis on partnerships.  This is particularly true for those who, 
like the Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General, are positioned 
to exercise agenda-setting power to coordinate disparate activities and 
pursue coherent policies.  The virtues of coordination, particularly in 
light of the ineffectiveness and hyper-politicization of the Security 
Council and General Assembly, may outweigh the downsides of the 
“vertical rivalry” distortions that come from increasing partnership 
activities.  That granted, rivalries remain another dimension on which 
abuses can occur, and structural safeguards again are necessary. 
C. Reputational Risk 
Even if the U.N. preserves its agenda and maintains structural 
balance in the face of increased, centrifugal partnership pressures, can it 
 
 118. See, e.g., KARNS & MINGST, supra note 5, at 137 (“Fundamentally . . . states are reluctant 
to see the U.N.’s dependence on them for its financing reduced too much because that would reduce 
their ability to control what the U.N. does.”).  The distortive effects of certain member-states may, 
of course, equal or eclipse the distortions produced by partnership activities, but proposing remedies 
for the intractable problem of member-state manipulation of the U.N. exceeds the scope of this 
Article. 
 119. See U.N. Charter art. 1.  
 120. See Kamhi, supra note 55, at 587-88. 
 121. Guidelines on Cooperation, supra note 101, § I(3) at 1. 
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withstand the pressure on its reputation and legal status presented by its 
many alliances?  The concern has been present from the start of the rise 
in partnerships.  The original Foundation agreement with the U.N. 
features a section providing rules for use of the name and emblem of the 
U.N., a concern also manifested in more recent “Guidelines on 
Cooperation.”122  The Foundation drafted “Good Governance Policies” 
that show explicit awareness of need to guard against “reputational risk 
to the UN” in light of the Foundation’s “partnership commitment to the 
UN.”123  The concern reflected consistently in legal documents from the 
origins of the Foundation and UNFIP down to the present is for the 
responsibility, reputation, and independence of the U.N.  Current 
“Guidelines on Cooperation” used in structuring partnerships emphasize 
that “[a]rrangements should not diminish the U.N.’s integrity, 
independence and impartiality.”124 
In tension with this caution, however, are the many public 
documents (statements, speeches, press releases, reports) trumpeting the 
U.N.’s partners and activities.125  The U.N. benefits from the publicity, 
in that it presents itself as a dynamic organization efficiently leveraging 
private funds to fight the world’s fight; on the other hand, the partners 
benefit far more, on the symbolic level.  The link with the U.N. and its 
“blue helmet” credibility provides an enormous boost to multinationals 
whose reputations are not always spotless.  The U.N. does not appear to 
have taken due account of the fact that, in addition to its experience and 
capacity, the U.N.’s reputation is a key part of what it brings to 
partnerships—and what it stands to lose.126  This is another sphere in 
 
 122. Id. § V at 2-3. The potential for embarrassment due to the U.N. Foundation's name has 
caused some adjustment in the Foundation's operations already.  In additional to aid activities, the 
Foundation engages in substantial public advocacy, and UNFIP has broadened its involvement in 
Foundation work by recruiting other organizations to partner with the Foundation.  The 
Foundation’s advocacy takes place most under the auspices of its “sister organization” the Better 
World Campaign, which it describes as a “vocal cheerleader[] for the United Nations and its 
causes.”  U.N. Foundation at Five Years, supra note 13, at 21. The Better World Campaign might 
better be described as an arm of the Foundation rather than as a sister organization, because it is 
indistinguishable from the Foundation in all but name.  A distinct name was presumably 
necessitated by the unseemliness of an organization called the U.N. Foundation, the name of which 
might make it appear to be an arm of the U.N., cheerleading for the U.N.  Early on, this advocacy 
yielded fruit in the form of payment by the U.S. of much of its overdue debt to the U.N.  Id. at 22. 
 123. U.N. Foundation Good Governance Policies § 4, http://www.globalproblems-
globalsolutions-files.org/gpgs_files/unf_website/PDF/Governance_Policies_and_Procedures.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
 124. Guidelines on Cooperation, supra note 101, § IV at 2.  
 125. See Preston, supra note 18, at 1-2. 
 126. On a theoretical level, it bears mentioning that the governments of member-states may 
consider reputational damage to the U.N. as damage to their interests mostly because as the U.N. is 
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which an Office of Independent Review’s assessment of potential 
partners and partnerships should be required before that reputation is put 
at stake.  The fear is that partnership activities, if hindered by some 
unforeseen catastrophe or by corruption, may expose the U.N. to 
devastating reputational harm, the cost of which will be borne primarily 
not by the partner but by the U.N.  The fallout from such an incident 
could significantly impede the organization’s ability to pursue its 
mandate, including its entering into other partnerships. 
These fears have not been realized—if they had, something like the 
proposals in this Article would certainly have been implemented already.  
But the potential is undoubtedly present.  It takes little digging to 
discover certain inconsistencies in partnership activities.  In 2008, for 
instance, just before the United Nations Development Fund for Women 
put out a report favorably discussing a class-action lawsuit that accuses 
Wal-Mart of pervasive gender discrimination,127 the Office for 
Partnerships released a report lauding a partnership with Wal-Mart: 
In 2007, under the guidance and support of the UNOP, Wal-
Mart became increasingly engaged in supporting United Nations 
causes, especially the efforts of the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to end violence against women.  Wal-
Mart has committed its intent to collaborate with the United 
Nations on the issue of gender-based violence and on specific needs 
for women in the workplace environment, specifically in large 
factories and major suppliers of Wal-Mart throughout the world.128 
The Office for Partnerships made no mention of the lawsuit, noted 
so prominently in a UNIFEM publication, that surely provided 
inspiration for Wal-Mart’s sudden spate of philanthropy in the arena of 
women’s issues. 
 
robbed of reputational capital, and that will both, of course, hamper the future effectiveness of the 
organization, but also will limit the available reputational capital that the governments can use in 
making the organization “an alibi or scapegoat” for tough policy decisions and activities that are 
unpopular domestically.  See Jones, supra note 57, at 307 (“If the agencies' activities damage 
electoral support, they are inclined to blame international agencies.”). 
 127. ANNE MARIE GOETZ ET AL., PROGRESS OF THE WORLD'S WOMEN 2008/2009, WHO 
ANSWERS TO WOMEN? 66 (2009) (Discussion titled:  “Seeking to Hold Wal-Mart Accountable for 
Gender Discrimination”).  The case is Dukes v. Wal-Mart, most recently affirmed in part and 
remanded in part upon en banc rehearing by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
at 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 128. 2008 Report, supra note 28, ¶ 26. 
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D. Erosion of Legal Immunity 
Damage to the U.N. from partnerships gone bad might be more 
than symbolic or reputational; partnerships test the bounds of the U.N.’s 
legal immunity in countries in which it operates.  The original agreement 
between the U.N. and the Foundation specifies that partnerships should 
not threaten the U.N.’s immunity,129 mentioning the issue twice: 
29.  The parties hereby acknowledge and agree that the 
Foundation is an entity established under United States law and 
separate and distinct from the United Nations and that it shall not 
be considered, for any purposes whatsoever, as having a legal status 
connected with or dependant upon the United Nations.  The 
personnel, agents or contractors of the Foundation shall not be 
considered in any respect or for any purposes whatsoever as being 
the employees or agents of the United Nations, nor shall any 
personnel, representatives or other affiliates of the United Nations 
be considered, for any purposes whatsoever, as being employees or 
agents of the Foundation. 
. . .  
32.  Nothing in or relating to this Agreement shall be deemed a 
waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities 
of the United Nations, including its principal and subsidiary 
organs.130 
Similarly, the Office for Partnerships’ “Sample Memorandum of 
Understanding” asserts that a partner organization “shall not be 
considered as an agent of the UNFIP,”131 seeking thus to avoid legal 
complications arising out of agency relationship. 
While there do not seem to have been any controversial situations 
as of yet, these conclusory statements that partnership does not 
compromise U.N. immunity or subject it to liability risks might not 
avail, should a cause of action arise from the work of a partner.  
Although public international organizations are generally well-protected 
by immunity doctrines from most forms of liability in domestic courts, 
and although the U.N. operates under an even more favorable set of 
immunities than most other international organizations (it is protected by 
 
 129. See UNFIP Preliminary Report, supra note 4, ¶ 12 (noting that the Advisory Committee 
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions specifically requested a change to the agreement to 
preserve this immunity). 
 130. Id.  Annex. 
 131. Sample Memorandum, supra note 34, art. V. 
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a separate immunity agreement132), the more attenuated the control of 
organizations over their agents, and the more they share control with 
partners, the more they risk exposing themselves and their employees to 
liability.  Most courts remain reluctant to pierce jurisdictional immunity 
of international organizations and their employees directly, but some are 
willing creatively to circumvent that immunity where necessary.133  The 
doctrinal rationales for immunity weaken as an organization becomes 
more closely entangled with private actors, wanders further from its core 
activities, or appears to have already bartered away some of the 
independence that immunity doctrine is in part intended to assure.134  
 
 132. On the immunity and legal responsibility of the U.N., see CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 
64, at 515-39 (“Immunity and Responsibility”); on international organization immunity generally, 
see Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Immunity Enjoyed by Officials of States and International 
Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 387, 404-11 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003); AUGUST 
REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (2000) (providing 
detailed cases and discussion of rationales and holdings regarding immunity of international 
organizations); KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 114-25, 
208-19 (2002) (discussing, from a remedies perspective, the application and rationale of immunity 
doctrines);  Davinia Abdul Aziz, Privileges and Immunities of Global Public-Private Partnerships: 
A Case Study of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 
383, 409 (2009) (arguing, after helpful analysis based on a particular type of partnership, that 
privileges and immunities “for global public-private partnerships should be strictly streamlined to 
purpose”). 
 133. WELLENS, supra note 132, at 120 (“Issues concerning the immunity of international 
organisations are primarily matters of international law . . . but the decision as to its scope normally 
rests solely with the forum state.” (footnotes omitted)); REINISCH, supra note 132, at 174-75 
(presenting some case law bearing on the issue of immunity extended to those exercising delegated 
authority and contractors, making clear that the law remains unsettled and untested).  Alleged 
international human rights violations provide an example of the increased perceived need for access.  
For discussion and case law, see id. at 281-305; see also id. at 321 nn.12-13 (citing cases in which 
“attempts [were made] to challenge measures of international organizations before international 
human rights organs,” and characterizing these cases as “witness[ing] [a] growing tendency of 
trying to hold international organizations accountable.”). 
 134. See WELLENS, supra note 132, at 125 (“Allowing claims brought against international 
organisations to be litigated would not only contribute to another public perception of international 
organizations, but also certainly substantially improve their accountability regime.”); REINISCH, 
supra note 132, at 233 (“The paramount rationale for granting immunities to international 
organizations . . . lies in securing their independence and guaranteeing their functioning.”).  
Reinisch comments: 
[I]n assessing whether or not domestic courts should refrain from adjudicating disputes 
involving international organizations, policy considerations, in particular the following 
two, should be taken into account more closely: 
  1. the prevailing rationale for abstention, on the one hand, is the necessity for 
ensuring that international organizations are able to fulfill their functions independently 
without any outside influence; and 
  2. on the other hand, it seems to be crucial that the vindication of ‘civil rights and 
obligations’ of private parties vis-à-vis international organizations as well as of 
international organizations themselves is sufficiently guaranteed. 
Id. at 392. 
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One worrisome case, for example, could arise if a nominal employee of 
a public international organization were to work so closely with a 
partner that a court considered the employee to be an agent of the 
partner, beyond the scope of the organization’s immunity protections.  
As with other public international organizations, the U.N.’s liability 
shield is thick—but not, perhaps, as wide as it might hope.  At the very 
least, the legal theories underlying “partnership” of this nature should be 
elaborated in official documents and followed in practice. 
Of course, the Office for Partnerships already has an incentive to 
minimize any legal and reputational impact: “bad” partnerships, 
attracting negative attention or eroding U.N. immunities, would prove 
costly to the Office that approved them.  Still, the collective cost to the 
U.N. as a whole would vastly outweigh any costs to the individual 
officers reprimanded or fired; the risk of reputational or liability costs of 
the Office’s over-promotion of partnerships is largely externalized on 
the entire U.N. system.  Practically speaking, it is far from apparent that 
given its apparent pro-partnership orientation, the Office has due 
awareness of the grave risks here outlined, nor does it necessarily have 
the resources to address them. 
IV.  A PROPOSAL:  THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
The Foundation and UNFIP have proclaimed again and again that 
their relationship has changed the way the work of the U.N. is conceived 
both within the U.N. and among non-governmental actors in the for-
profit and non-profit realms.135  Their claim is no exaggeration, although 
the previous Part argues that the rise of partnerships carries risks in 
addition to rewards.  The U.N.’s experience with the Foundation and 
many other partners has brought significant growth in its capacity for 
partnerships, and this shift falls in line with the widespread rise of civil 
society and private sector influence in the international law and policy of 
development, security, and regulatory coordination.  By contrast, the aid 
community historically had little trust in the U.N. to serve as an 
efficient, innovative, or reliable conduit for funding and projects.136  
Long overdue, this change may hold great promise for more efficient, 
accountable, and politically-insulated aid activities in the future. 
 
 135. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 11. 
 136. See CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 372 (noting the preference, among “[w]ealthy 
countries,” for non-U.N. institutions for their “development funding”).  “[T]he U.N. system and its 
agencies were simply never trusted by the donor community to the extent that the [World] Bank and 
the [International Monetary] Fund were.”  Id. at 373. 
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As part of this broad change, legal controls should continue to 
evolve, to allow room for this sort of adaptation while remaining true to 
the basic commitments and values enshrined in the Charter and other 
fundamental documents.  No new institutional structure can completely 
eradicate this tension, and continued change and contestation should be 
expected as part of the natural process of adapting a large public 
institution to a changing world.  Still, there are strong steps that could 
and should be taken by the U.N.—as by other similar organizations—to 
streamline partnership activities and guard against their pitfalls.137  This 
Part proposes one important step—the establishment of an Office of 
Independent Review (OIR)—and explains what the mandate of this new 
entity should be. 
This paper proposes that the OIR be tasked with the following 
responsibilities:  (1) similarly to the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (especially its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs),138 
analyze proposed partnerships and produce organizational impact reports 
to enhance cooperation across agencies and to coordinate various 
partnership efforts so that they efficiently advance strategic goals; (2) 
develop best practices for partnership agreements and activities, by 
evaluation of previous partnership efforts; (3) similarly to U.S. 
Inspectors General,139 investigate and report on allegations of 
malfeasance and other manipulation or exploitation by U.N. entities or 
their partners; (4) ensure the compatibility of partnership ideas and their 
means of execution with U.N. ideals and goals, by prospective review of 
proposed partnerships; (5) insist on as much transparency as is feasible, 
 
 137. As discussed in this Part, the implementation of these steps would be in line with steps 
taken of late by other international organizations to bolster accountability.  See, e.g., Kingsbury, 
Stewart & Krisch, supra note 58, at 34-35 (“Internal Mechanisms Adopted by Global Institutions 
for Participation and Accountability”).  Here as elsewhere on the global arena, uncritically 
embracing the free-form intervention of private partners might not be efficient from a policy 
perspective.  See, e.g., David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006) (critiquing 
another form of public-private collaboration—informal, horizontal network-based administrative 
rule (“best practices”) development—in the domestic and global spheres). 
 138. Of course, these organizations are themselves hardly immune from criticism.  See 
generally GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  CASES AND COMMENTS 609-25, 638-58, 
698-705 (Strauss et al. eds., rev.10th ed. 2003) (basic documentary history of OMB and OIRA, and 
some critique); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 68-72 (1993) (basic explanation and critique of role of OMB and OIRA in modern 
regulatory process). 
 139. See generally Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts:  
Creating an Office of the Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243, 243-52 (1999) (basic history 
of offices of the inspectors general in federal agencies); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING 
GOVERNMENT:  INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993) (extensive 
history of inspectors-general movement up to the early 1990s). 
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from U.N. entities and partners; (6) solicit and take account of comments 
from affected parties and members of the public concerning 
partnerships; and (7) regularly review the overall role of partnerships 
within the U.N. system to ensure that partnerships, and the possibility 
they present for institutional rivalry and aggrandizement, do not distract 
the Secretariat or individual agencies from their prescribed roles—or 
from pursuing the most efficient fulfillment of these roles. 
To ensure independence in these activities, the OIR would have to 
be sealed off from the rest of the Office for Partnerships, in terms of its 
hiring, staffing, procedures, and substantive judgments.  Its head would 
have to answer either to the Secretary-General directly—or, given the 
worries about Office of the Secretary-General aggrandizement, to 
another high-level official or entity unaffiliated with the other U.N. 
partnership entities.  Further, in order to maintain its own credibility and 
accountability, most of its work should be made public, subject to 
confidentiality considerations. 
Because its tasks are heavily oriented toward accountability, the 
OIR would liaise with existing U.N. entities responsible for monitoring 
and improving U.N. operations, for instance the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services,140 Board of Auditors,141 Joint Inspection Unit,142 
and Evaluation Group.143  But it should be separate from these entities, 
 
 140. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICE, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (“The Office assists Member States and 
the Organization in protecting its assets and in ensuring the compliance of programme activities 
with resolutions, regulations, rules and policies as well as the more efficient and effective delivery 
of the Organization’s activities; preventing and detecting fraud, waste, abuse, malfeasance or 
mismanagement; and improving the delivery of the Organization’s programmes and activities to 
enable it to achieve better results by determining all factors affecting the efficient and effective 
implementation of programmes.”). 
 141. UNITED NATIONS BOARD OF AUDITORS, http://www.un.org/auditors/board/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2010) (“[T]he accounts and management operations of the United Nations and its Funds and 
Programmes are required to be audited and reported on periodically by independent external 
auditors [i.e., the Board of Auditors].”). 
 142. The Joint Inspection Unit of the U.N. System, About JIU, 
http://www.unjiu.org/en/about.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (“The Unit is composed of not more 
than eleven Inspectors appointed by the General Assembly on the basis of their special experience 
in national or international administrative and financial matters . . . . They are mandated to provide 
an independent view through inspection and evaluation aimed at improving management and 
methods and at achieving greater coordination between organizations.”). 
 143. About U.N. Evaluation Group, http://www.uneval.org/about/index.jsp?ret=true (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2010) (“UNEG . . . has 43 members. Membership is institutional with the Units 
responsible for evaluation in the UN system, including the specialized agencies, funds, programmes 
and affiliated organisations, eligible for membership.  These Units should have, or aspire to have, 
the required professional knowledge, experience and responsibility for evaluation as defined by the 
UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2005).”). 
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which are spread thin, have been subject to embarrassment and criticism 
of their own,144 and are primarily focused on post-hoc evaluation or ex 
ante establishment of general principles rather than being incorporated, 
structurally, in real-time decisionmaking.  OIR’s unique focus and role 
in partnership decisions would best be preserved by maintaining its 
independence from these organs as well. 
Finally, while its opinion would naturally carry weight, nothing is 
to say that the OIR should necessarily have veto power over partnership 
activities; rather, its opinions should be viewed as persuasive authority, 
with ultimate decisionmaking in tough cases left up to higher-level 
officials.  Cumulatively over time, OIR reports likely would be 
persuasive, and its role as independent evaluator would cheapen 
monitoring costs by member-states and lead to more effective oversight 
of the U.N.’s exercise of delegated powers.145 
OIR’s partnership-restricting, “gatekeeper” function should be 
balanced by its project-generative capacity.  Ideally, OIR’s analyses 
would stimulate partnership ideas by suggesting directions in which 
there is untapped potential for some types of donors to work with U.N. 
partners.  Agenda creep would then work in favor of U.N. interests 
rather than against them, which is the current risk. 
An additional project-generative side of the proposed OIR 
procedures is that member-state government entities might respond to 
heightened accountability and rationality in partnerships by greater 
willingness to commit resources and expertise to partnerships.  By 
contrast, without the assurance, the “political cover,” provided by a 
credible independent review, government entities might face legal or 
policy obstacles to involvement in partnerships.  Removing the taint or 
suspicion of partnership might encourage partnerships while rooting out 
manipulative or distortive actors or projects and discouraging “bad 
behavior” by partners and agencies. 
An important question is why these functions must be delegated to 
a new office rather than simply promulgated among existing entities and 
coordinated by the existing Office for Partnerships.  In support of this 
objection is the fact that creation of a new office is a classically 
 
 144. See CHESTERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 540-97. 
 145. As a policy matter, of course, I do not argue or suggest that states, as members of the 
General Assembly, necessarily make better policy than private foundations and other partners, or 
than the Office of the Secretariat.  But structurally, as the U.N. is currently organized, member-
states bear responsibility for U.N. agenda-setting and project management, so enhancing their 
effectiveness in this role is a goal that internal U.N. law, such as that proposed here, should pursue.  
Of course, the proposal has other benefits, as noted, that go beyond accountability to member-states. 
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inefficient, bureaucratic way of compounding the existing bureaucratic 
risks and inefficiencies:146 a cure worse than the disease. 
After all, there have not been any serious, public problems with 
partnerships so far, despite over ten years of intensive partnership 
efforts.  U.N. agencies have been put on notice that they should remain 
wary of possible problems arising from partnership activities.147  
Additionally, since its inception, the Foundation/UNFIP partnership has 
been well-documented, transparent, and perhaps even too bureaucratic in 
setting its guidelines.148  Its actions seem to have been diligently tailored 
so that it could serve as a trustworthy model, to give assurance that 
money funneled through U.N. programs and partnerships would not be 
wasted or ill-spent: 
As we have worked to secure new partnerships, we also serve as an 
effective steward of resources for UN causes and have established 
secure systems of financial accountability and oversight with the 
care and transparency necessary to satisfy all participants.  As a 
result, the UN Foundation has won a reputation as a flexible, 
responsible conduit for funding UN causes.149 
So it is true in many ways that “Ted Turner’s visionary approach 
now serves as a model for other partners to engage in United Nations 
causes.”150  For instance, drafters of partnership agreements are referred 
to U.N. Foundation agreements and procedures as a model.151  Indeed, 
as noted, the practices of the Foundation and its U.N. facilitators have 
facilitated a huge growth in partnerships. 
The fact that so much has gone right so far is a tribute to the 
transparency and publicity of partnership activities over more than a 
decade, as well as the care and responsibility exercised by the U.N. and 
Foundation officials.  Their practices send a message that these 
organizations are seeking to be legally above-board, accountable, and 
clear about the terms of their relationships.  Institutionally, as was noted 
 
 146. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT:  FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE 
DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1-31 (1995) (introducing unintended consequences, in U.S. 
government, of well-meaning application of “principles of administration” as (failed) antidote to 
government sprawl and loss of accountability). 
 147. Guidelines on Cooperation, supra note 101, § VII(19)(b) at 4 (“Within each [U.N.] 
organization, a focal point should be nominated to ensure transparency, learning and a better 
understanding of the role and objectives of business and to ascertain whether they are compatible 
with the goals of the UN.”). 
 148. See Fifth Year Report, supra note 26, ¶ 11. 
 149. U.N. FOUNDATION AT FIVE YEARS, supra note 13, at 75. 
 150. UNFIP Sixth Year Report, supra note 46, ¶ 66. 
 151. Guidelines on Cooperation, supra note 101, Annex 2 at 6. 
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in Part II, the increase in partnerships may have improved the efficient 
functioning of the U.N. by encouraging salutary rivalries among 
agencies for good, new ideas, as well as funneling power to the 
Secretariat, which can most effectively coordinate activities.  (In this 
respect, the proposed OIR differs from the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, which at least in part exists to further the agenda-setting and 
policymaking power of the chief executive.152) 
These objections to the creation of a separate office are powerful, 
and perhaps for some organizations of less scope and sprawl than the 
U.N., ad-hoc solutions would be enough.  But for an organization such 
as the U.N., accountability must be structurally built in, or it cannot be 
meaningfully present for the long term.  There are too many ways in 
which problems of agenda distortion, destructive rivalries, and even 
reputational and legal liabilities, can hide themselves for a time or 
forever.  As the deterioration they cause goes undetected, the problems 
can pile up—the processes of agenda distortion, reputation decline, and 
structural malformation are problems that once entrenched are difficult 
to reverse.  The operative general principle here is that problems that 
cannot be detected and corrected as they arise must be addressed by 
preemptive, structural safeguards.  Furthermore, to rely on self-policing, 
or policing by partners, ignores the very nature of the problem of 
“partner capture,” which is that the incentives for partners, and for their 
U.N. contacts, will be precisely to pursue the sort of dangerous behavior 
outlined in the previous Part of this Article.  Only a truly independent 
office would have the incentive both to become fully informed about the 
effects of individual partnerships on the U.N. as a whole and to act on 
that information—ultimately, to ensure that U.N. resources are indeed 
leveraged by partnership activities, not diverted by them. 
The OIR should not be established solely out of fear or suspicion of 
outside entities that might “infect” the U.N. or any other international 
organization with alien priorities.  Of course, the U.N. should 
aggressively protect itself against corruption, capture, or self-
entrenchment, and the OIR would have capacity for such protection.  
But more than simple policing is needed.  The OIR would provide a 
focal point for consideration of the directions in which growth can and 
should occur.  Ultimately, the goal of the U.N. as of all international 
organizations should be to ascertain the best ways in which activities can 
be conceived, organized, and funded—whether by governments or by 
 
 152. See GELLHORN &  BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 138, at 615. 
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private partnerships or by some other way as-yet-undeveloped—to 
advance its lofty mandate. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The rise of public-private partnerships has proven a boon to public 
international organizations, whose broad mandates but limited budgets 
lead them too often to disappoint public expectations.  But the 
enthusiastic response of these organizations should be tempered with an 
awareness of the new types of responsibilities incumbent on the 
organizations when extending their reach with partnerships.  Lessons 
from similar situations encountered by other bureaucracies may be a key 
to adjusting to this new role effectively.  Both philanthropies and 
international organizations have passed through several stages of 
evolution already, and as both sets of players shift into increasingly 
important roles on the global stage, a further step toward rational 
structure, coordination, and evaluation is merited. 
As this Article has demonstrated, both the partner capture problem 
and its solution connect with a broader movement in international law, 
which has begun to recognize that new forms of effective global 
regulation and governance cannot be allowed to outstrip the 
implementation of the safeguards against abuse that have developed in 
domestic law.  Legal guidelines and high-minded mandates are not in 
themselves enough; rather, international actors must establish soundly 
designed accountability institutions and mechanisms to keep pace with 
increasing delegations of responsibilities to international organizations 
and networks.  This discussion of how to prevent partner capture 
supplies one example of the potential of international law to develop 
beyond its traditional sources and forms and to become more effective 
by drawing on domestic analogues, grounded in theory and practice, that 
can provide reliable guidance in addressing new challenges. 
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